NOT WHAT IT SEEMS

When events seem not to make sense, they probably do. This observation may help to explain the current situation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Reading about and watching events unfold after the Gaza withdrawal gives one the feeling of frustration, disbelief and shattered hopes. The same litany of pre-Gaza withdrawal behavior is being conducted by all the relevant players: West Bank drive-by shootings (Al Aksa), homicide bombers (Islamic Jihad) and the use of Qassam missiles (on loan from Hamas but again Jihad) are as common as they were before. The Palestinian Islamic and nationalistic liberation groups continue to use violence to conduct their policy goals. The by-the-book Israeli response--West Bank road lockdown, arrest sweeps into West Bank towns for the perps and helicopter missile assassinations of violent leaders in their cars--is as predictable as thunder after lightning. Meanwhile, the new player on the block, the one semi-fresh face in all this violent drama, Mohammed Abbas, remains as passive as a Buddha, only attired in a suit and tie rather than saffron robes. He occasionally throws a verbal dig at the “silly” slaughter of Israelis on a falafel line and lectures the violent opposition that their actions “invite the Israelis to harm our people,” but in a region that prizes actions over passive pronouncements Abbas seems little different than Arafat, who often said the same thing when the international community was in the audience.

Once again, the near and far choral group of Sharon, Bush and a few European statesmen hit their high notes and beg Abbas to “crack down on terror.” The standard press releases issued from the Israeli military and governmental spokesmen denouncing Abbas’s “do nothing policy” against terror, followed by the “we will do it ourselves” threat/promise, have been articulated so many times during this intifada that they have taken on the mien of a blessing before a meal. Both the Israelis and the interested players in the West seem genuinely shocked, shocked that Abbas and the remnants of the PLO will not or cannot even suppress the armed violent factions from displaying their weapons in public.

The Mideast desks of all the press services and newspapers are sending out the same line, i.e., the peace process is in danger of unraveling, the truce is very fragile, the situation could return to the war of before. It seems as though Abbas cannot stop the Palestinians from sliding into violence as they seek a state in the West Bank and Gaza. As punishment for this the Israelis respond that they “don’t see a state anytime soon.” Is this true? Can there be no progress? Is Abbas a pathetic figure who is powerless to assert control over those who have chosen the house of war as their path?

The answer to the question is one that cannot be publicly spoken. No, he may not be. He only wants to appear so. Using your enemy to destroy your enemy is a time-tested strategy, especially in the Middle East. A cursory reading of books about the Islamic conquest, the subsequent Crusades and the Ottoman conquest of the region reveals that shifting alliances with improbable allies were the norm when a greater goal was in mind. Both Christian and Islamic armies frequently took five from the main thrust to eliminate a troublesome enemy before resuming the main battle. Could Abbas be a wily leader in the school of Murad ll?

All he has to do is provide, through countless untraceable minions, the exact address or autoroute of his enemies to Bet Shin and, presto, they are dust and ashes or under arrest. How did the Israeli army sweep into Jenin this last week to arrest and kill the latest heads of Islamic Jihad? How did they pinpoint Shadi Muhana as he drove down the street after praying? Is it possible that Abbas will use the Israelis to accomplish what he doesn’t want to do publicly? There are a thousand informers who can improve their position in life by turning in the violent members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al Aksa. Under Arafat they would have been seen as traitors, but Abbas has given them political cover. He has stated from the beginning that the violent Islamic and nationalistic factions are inimical to the interests of the Palestinian people. He has verbally made this very clear, and the U.S. and E.U. have accepted his remarks and strategy at face value. Thus, if the state of Israel eliminates the leadership of the violent factions by arrests and killings he would accomplish his goal without appearing to have caused the very events he sanctioned. The cover for all this is the necessary hand-wringing of the Israelis and the Western leaders, begging him to do something to stop the violence. If they publicly thank him for the latest militant’s names, addresses and times of arrival and departure a civil war would ensue, or at least an attempt on his life.

The press conference in Gaza last week by the combined Jihad and Al Aksa groups was very revealing. It may be seen as a sign of weakness rather than strength, of cold wolves bundled together for warmth, of lesser numbers seeking protection; in the weeks before, hundreds were arrested. Key top commanders were rounded up or just shot in their front yards while they tried to flee. Commanders of the faithful and their so-called bodyguards were burned alive in their cars from unseen drones above: all this after five Israelis on a lunch break were killed and dozens wounded. How long can the violent factions take this kind of asymmetrical warfare? It is not entirely inconceivable that Hamas itself is so bereft of leadership after the Israeli assassinations of its leadership that it would turn in its rivals to insure its own preeminence and survival. There are other leaders too in Gaza that might want to wear the mantle of boss and will use any means to eliminate rivals in the way. Gaza has not only turned into a huge prison as many feared; it has turned into a free fire zone where the Israelis can fire at will any time of the day or night without fear of friendly fire casualties. The totally disproportionate response that can be aimed at Gaza for the launching of the erratic Qassams is so clear that the firing of these missiles could be seen as an invitation to national suicide on the part of the violent factions.

Abbas knows this, and others may too, so while the Kabuki theater of actions and press releases seems to auger a return to the bad old days, it may not be so. With PLO help Israel can eliminate those sworn to its destruction and, when the field is clearer, sit down with the victorious “it wasn’t me” Abbas to address the real parameters of a separation of the two peoples into two states. Meanwhile, don’t tell anyone; it will only spoil the plan.