NOT WHAT IT SEEMS

When events seem not to make sense, they probably do. This observation may help to explain the current situation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Reading about and watching events unfold after the Gaza withdrawal gives one the feeling of frustration, disbelief and shattered hopes. The same litany of pre-Gaza withdrawal behavior is being conducted by all the relevant players: West Bank drive-by shootings (Al Aksa), homicide bombers (Islamic Jihad) and the use of Qassam missiles (on loan from Hamas but again Jihad) are as common as they were before. The Palestinian Islamic and nationalistic liberation groups continue to use violence to conduct their policy goals. The by-the-book Israeli response--West Bank road lockdown, arrest sweeps into West Bank towns for the perps and helicopter missile assassinations of violent leaders in their cars--is as predictable as thunder after lightning. Meanwhile, the new player on the block, the one semi-fresh face in all this violent drama, Mohammed Abbas, remains as passive as a Buddha, only attired in a suit and tie rather than saffron robes. He occasionally throws a verbal dig at the “silly” slaughter of Israelis on a falafel line and lectures the violent opposition that their actions “invite the Israelis to harm our people,” but in a region that prizes actions over passive pronouncements Abbas seems little different than Arafat, who often said the same thing when the international community was in the audience.

Once again, the near and far choral group of Sharon, Bush and a few European statesmen hit their high notes and beg Abbas to “crack down on terror.” The standard press releases issued from the Israeli military and governmental spokesmen denouncing Abbas’s “do nothing policy” against terror, followed by the “we will do it ourselves” threat/promise, have been articulated so many times during this intifada that they have taken on the mien of a blessing before a meal. Both the Israelis and the interested players in the West seem genuinely shocked, shocked that Abbas and the remnants of the PLO will not or cannot even suppress the armed violent factions from displaying their weapons in public.

The Mideast desks of all the press services and newspapers are sending out the same line, i.e., the peace process is in danger of unraveling, the truce is very fragile, the situation could return to the war of before. It seems as though Abbas cannot stop the Palestinians from sliding into violence as they seek a state in the West Bank and Gaza. As punishment for this the Israelis respond that they “don’t see a state anytime soon.” Is this true? Can there be no progress? Is Abbas a pathetic figure who is powerless to assert control over those who have chosen the house of war as their path?

The answer to the question is one that cannot be publicly spoken. No, he may not be. He only wants to appear so. Using your enemy to destroy your enemy is a time-tested strategy, especially in the Middle East. A cursory reading of books about the Islamic conquest, the subsequent Crusades and the Ottoman conquest of the region reveals that shifting alliances with improbable allies were the norm when a greater goal was in mind. Both Christian and Islamic armies frequently took five from the main thrust to eliminate a troublesome enemy before resuming the main battle. Could Abbas be a wily leader in the school of Murad ll?

All he has to do is provide, through countless untraceable minions, the exact address or autoroute of his enemies to Bet Shin and, presto, they are dust and ashes or under arrest. How did the Israeli army sweep into Jenin this last week to arrest and kill the latest heads of Islamic Jihad? How did they pinpoint Shadi Muhana as he drove down the street after praying? Is it possible that Abbas will use the Israelis to accomplish what he doesn’t want to do publicly? There are a thousand informers who can improve their position in life by turning in the violent members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al Aksa. Under Arafat they would have been seen as traitors, but Abbas has given them political cover. He has stated from the beginning that the violent Islamic and nationalistic factions are inimical to the interests of the Palestinian people. He has verbally made this very clear, and the U.S. and E.U. have accepted his remarks and strategy at face value. Thus, if the state of Israel eliminates the leadership of the violent factions by arrests and killings he would accomplish his goal without appearing to have caused the very events he sanctioned. The cover for all this is the necessary hand-wringing of the Israelis and the Western leaders, begging him to do something to stop the violence. If they publicly thank him for the latest militant’s names, addresses and times of arrival and departure a civil war would ensue, or at least an attempt on his life.

The press conference in Gaza last week by the combined Jihad and Al Aksa groups was very revealing. It may be seen as a sign of weakness rather than strength, of cold wolves bundled together for warmth, of lesser numbers seeking protection; in the weeks before, hundreds were arrested. Key top commanders were rounded up or just shot in their front yards while they tried to flee. Commanders of the faithful and their so-called bodyguards were burned alive in their cars from unseen drones above: all this after five Israelis on a lunch break were killed and dozens wounded. How long can the violent factions take this kind of asymmetrical warfare? It is not entirely inconceivable that Hamas itself is so bereft of leadership after the Israeli assassinations of its leadership that it would turn in its rivals to insure its own preeminence and survival. There are other leaders too in Gaza that might want to wear the mantle of boss and will use any means to eliminate rivals in the way. Gaza has not only turned into a huge prison as many feared; it has turned into a free fire zone where the Israelis can fire at will any time of the day or night without fear of friendly fire casualties. The totally disproportionate response that can be aimed at Gaza for the launching of the erratic Qassams is so clear that the firing of these missiles could be seen as an invitation to national suicide on the part of the violent factions.

Abbas knows this, and others may too, so while the Kabuki theater of actions and press releases seems to auger a return to the bad old days, it may not be so. With PLO help Israel can eliminate those sworn to its destruction and, when the field is clearer, sit down with the victorious “it wasn’t me” Abbas to address the real parameters of a separation of the two peoples into two states. Meanwhile, don’t tell anyone; it will only spoil the plan.

PARADISE NOW

PARADISE NOW
Before the opening credits roll on screen, the distributor has put all of this film’s awards on a card; these have the effect of a critics’ seal of approval. The not-so-subtle message is this: what you are about to see has already been vetted by the film intelligentsia at Berlin, Toronto and Telluride, so think about it what you will; however, it’s beyond your rejection as a film or political statement. This has a profound effect upon the moviegoer as one is forced to decode in advance what was so winning at the film festivals. Was it the plot, the political statements, the presentation of the conflict, or just the acting?
The story centers around two close friends who have a difficult job working at an auto repair shop in the town of Nablus on the West Bank in Palestine. Their employer, irrational customers and looming Israeli roadblocks cramp their existence. Without further ado they are revealed to be a cell of suicide bombers under the control of a Hamas/Jihad/Al Aksa operative and his legendary higher-up. Prepared and outfitted for a suicide mission against the citizens of Tel Aviv, they are sent out to a boarder crossing and the plan fails at the outset. This failure sets in motion changes of heart within each bomber to varying degrees, and familiar strife as well as panic within the terrorist organization. A potential love interest named Suha (Lubna Azabal) emerges in a key role, both to save her object of attraction, and to act as a debating partner as to the merits of blowing up women and children on a bus and its furtherance of the Palestinian cause.
Much has been debated about the moral validity of suicide terror. Much has been debated about the political usefulness of suicide terror. Much has been debated about the military effectiveness of suicide terror. We will not add to that debate here. However, the film has scenes and dialogue that offer a fascinating window into the new realities of Palestinian thought. We can be thankful to the filmmakers for exposing these thoughts and concepts to a wider audience.
A group of 12- to 15-year-olds is credited with starting the first intifada by throwing stones at Israeli soldiers in Gaza. The youth of the occupied territories have always played a huge role in confronting the Israelis, with their unequal levels of weapons. This theme is explored in Paradise Now many times. The dialogue of Said and Khaled, the potential martyrs, is full of references to the superior weaponry of the Israelis, and in case you miss the point, out of nowhere visuals of tanks and jets are inserted for effect. But the real revelation and seemingly unintentional message of the film is the complete historical vacuum they themselves occupy.
In Iran the vast majority of the population was not alive when the hated Shah ruled. Similarly, in occupied Palestine the majority of the population was not alive when the combined multi-nation Arab armies invaded in 1967. To our would-be bombers Khaled and Said, the occupation seems to be a naturally occurring fact on the ground. Hany Abu-Assad, the director, presents the roadblocks that try to prevent the very bombings that are being planned as if they were set up out of pique. If one does not know why the Israelis seized the West Bank and Gaza (they were invasion routes the Arab armies used to try to destroy the U.N.-sanctioned nation that had existed for 19 years) a cinema viewer might think that someone in the Israeli army just woke up one day and decided to invade a peaceful neighbor on a whim. The debate between Suha, representing the forces of moderation, and her bomber boyfriend is all about tactics; the why of the occupation is never mentioned or examined.
There is a fascinating scene in a car with Suha and Khaled looking for Said as he is still wired to explode. They have a debate as to the moral and tactical advantages of the various forms of resistance and their effect upon the struggle. Suha believes that the use of self-destruction accomplishes nothing and in fact allows the Israelis to be both “the aggressor and the victim.” She does not believe that it is an effective tool in the arsenal of war. Khaled argues that it is all they have, and that since they have been so defeated anything is better than nothing, or thoughts to that effect. Never in this or any other scene in the movie does anyone say, “Look, the Arabs have tried to destroy the Jewish people three times in the last 57 years, to annihilate them and drive them into the sea. In this war for a historical homeland of a people older than us, they fought back bravely and won against our intended slaughter, and never has any one of our leaders apologized or asked for peace or accepted their right to exist. Instead, all we have done is launch a campaign of murder against athletes and cripples and bus riders. Is this a way to regain a country that never really existed anyway?”
To Palestinian youth, one of the legacies bequeathed to them by their ineffectual terrorist-tactic-using leaders is not only an occupied homeland but a case of mass amnesia as to why their fate is one of impoverishment and failure. Paradise Now vividly demonstrates how those who are lacking historical knowledge cause wars, like the one between the Irish Protestants and Catholics, which go on and on. The roadblocks and ruined buildings of Nablus become the only context; their reality is the reality of oppression without meaning. Without context the Israeli soldiers and their civilian backers must seem malicious and evil to the bombers the same way the ranting and raving of Iranian revolutionary guards against the “great Satan” must seem odd and strange to a 15-year-old who knows nothing of the Shah. In a sense, by refusing to make peace with Israel the old guard of Palestinian leaders have insured themselves of victory: the war they wanted will be continued by a younger generation aware only of the present. To fight against Zionist oppressors who appear to be just that does make for effective fighters. We can see that in both Gaza and the West Bank, where attending funerals of assassinated suicide bombers seems like the highlight of the week. The only problem is that if the other side is stronger and is just as ruthless, the fight becomes one of hate without political, strategic or geographical context. It is this realization on the Israelis’ part that is behind the separation barrier currently disfiguring the landscape between the two peoples.
The resort to savagery and slaughter of children and old people on buses and in cafés and schools has left the impression on the Israelis that this is just a pogrom. An opportunity to kill Jews. Paradise Now does nothing to change that impression: there is absolutely no talk of recognizing Israel’s sovereignty, of an apology for attacking a lawful country within its sanctioned legitimate borders, of a post-occupation plan for rebuilding the two entwined countries, nor is there any discussion of how two people linked for centuries can co-exist; there is only talk of revenge and “operations.”
Go see Paradise Now because it’s vitally important to understand the other side and see into their minds and understand where they are coming from. Since it’s more than they would do for us, this knowledge will be useful.